观观市 登录
← 返回视频简报
B站金融学院 已完成

瑞·达利欧 谈美国债务危机、利率问题、人工智能、欧洲的风险状况,以及美国与中国之间的竞争。2026/11/6

2026-11-06 10:32 · 时长 25分46秒 · 模型 gpt-6.1-sol · 在 B 站打开 ↗
#债务危机 #利率走势 #全球资本

瑞·达利欧 谈美国债务危机、利率问题、人工智能、欧洲的风险状况,以及美国与中国之间的竞争。2026/11/6

瑞·达利欧认为,美国及欧洲正面临债务与偿债成本不断上升、资金供需失衡的压力,利率上涨将挤压私人部门融资,并加剧经济与财富分化。

  • 债务危机的核心是偿债负担持续挤压支出。 当债务积累速度超过偿还速度,偿债成本占现金流的比例就会上升,压缩其他支出的空间。国家与个人面临类似约束,区别在于国家可以印钞;同时,一方的债务也是另一方持有的资产,因此还要考察债权人是否愿意继续持有。

  • 美国财政收支存在巨大缺口。 主持人称美国债务已超过 40万亿美元,30年期国债收益率正逼近 6%。达利欧用年度支出约 7万亿美元、收入约 5万亿美元说明问题:支出比收入高 40%,每年缺口约 2万亿美元,长期延续会推动债务和偿债支出不断增长。

  • 达利欧判断,债务挤压问题可能在未来三年内明显显现。 面对主持人关于未来 24—36个月是否会出现债务危机的提问,他表示认同,并强调应观察偿债负担对其他支出、资产价格及利率的影响。这是他在访谈中的预测。

  • 6%并非他认定的利率上限,关键是资金供求。 他没有给出6%或6.5%的明确顶部判断,而是强调比较储蓄及可用资本与融资需求:当资金供给不足以满足需求,利率就会上升,直到部分借款需求被迫退出。

  • 政府融资需求难以收缩,私人部门会先承受挤压。 政府赤字对利率变化不敏感,经济恶化时甚至可能扩大。因此,住房、汽车贷款等对利率敏感的领域可能先受冲击,数据中心等投资则可能较晚受到影响;财力较弱的人群受到的压力更大,可能加剧财富分化与社会矛盾。

  • 利率上涨也会损害现有债券持有者。 债券收益率上升意味着现有债券价格下降,投资者因此蒙受损失,进而影响继续持有和购买债券的意愿。达利欧强调,债券投资需要结合周期判断,不能简单延续过去长期持有政府债务的经验。

  • 美国仍在吸收大量资本,但海外资金来源正在收紧。 按他的说法,美国债务融资中接近 三分之一依赖外国资本,中国、日本及中东等是重要来源。中国继续增持美国债务的意愿受到经济与地缘政治因素制约;日本因自身政策调整,也有收回部分海外资金的需求。债权债务关系与战略对立并存,使中美之间的资金关系更加复杂。

  • 人工智能投资增加了整体融资需求。 除政府赤字外,人工智能、数据中心等大规模资本开支也在争夺储蓄资金。他还指出,某些繁荣领域的融资正从股权转向更多依赖债务,使这些领域更容易受到利率与信贷条件变化的影响。

  • 法国及欧洲面临类似的债务约束。 达利欧认为,长期依靠借款维持支出的模式,在借贷空间接近极限后将难以延续。财政调整和偿债压力可能推动政府寻求增税,而部分纳税人迁离又会进一步削弱税基;利率上升造成的债券价格下跌也会增加压力。不过,所给文字稿未包含他对欧洲风险传染路径的完整分析。

文字稿末尾存在明显重复与截断;其中关于人工智能和中美竞争的讨论,主要限于融资需求与跨境资本关系。

▸ 原始转写文字稿(8606 字符)
Ray Dalio, good to have you with us. Good to have you on Insight. It's always a pleasure to be here. Ray, you always talk about the five forces, one of which is the debt cycle. We have a U.S. with a debt of in access of $40 trillion. No wonder, not quite surprising, that 30-year yields are headed towards 6 percent. How are you reading what's happening there? I think it's just important to understand the mechanics. That's why I wrote the book, How Countries Go Broke, because there's a mechanical process, and people don't understand it. And it's really quite simple. The way it works for countries is the same. It works for individuals, except countries can print money. Okay. But one man's debts are another man's liability. So what happens is when debts accumulate faster than they're paid back, then debt service costs grow. And so that becomes a higher and higher percentage of one's cash flow. And when that happens, it starts to squeeze out spending. And so then you have a problem. So in the United States, so we have that dynamic as it squeeze it out. Then also one man's assets or another man's liabilities for debt. And so you have to think about what are they holding? And is it holding wealth? And is it effective? So those are the two drivers. And so what we're seeing now, for example, on the U.S. debt is that we spend about seven trillion a year. Think about this like a business or an individual. They spend seven. Okay. They take in five. Okay. Spending 40% more than they're taking in. And they've been doing that for a number of years. So as a result, debt and debt service payments are building. And as a result, they are squeezing out the spending. So we have that kind of a dynamic going on. And then we also have one man's debts or another man's assets. And so when you see interest rates rise naturally because of this supply demand imbalance, it produces losses in those assets. And so think about bonds as an asset to hold and how bad bonds have been as interest rates rise. And that has an effect. It's a different picture from when you were trading, right? Because, I mean, you benefited from investing in government debt for a very long time, for 50 years. Would you do it differently this time around? There's always be long and short depending on the nature of the cycle, right? When things get worse. But what we have now is a situation where there's the rate at which it's compounding, the size of it. You know, why does the market go down? The market goes down because there's too much debt and we're adding to it at that rate. So and then we're approaching our limits. OK. And then there are geopolitical changes. You know that the United States could run large deficits. But now because of conflicts, we also have a dynamic in which those who want to hold U.S. debt, they're holding too much already. So we have that dynamic going on. And you could see it if you were to just calculate, which is in the book I wrote, you know, how countries go broke, the big cycle. It shows how that debt service payment then is squeezing out spending. And so you can see that dynamic work. So is a debt crisis imminent in the U.S. with yields, 30 year yields headed towards six? Yes. In other words, within the next 24 months, 36 months. I think within the next three years, what we have is that issue of that squeezing it out. And so when you take a look at literally what that means and then what the impact of that is going to be on asset prices and interest rates matter. So you have a boom which is concentrated in one area, really, that is heavily debt financed. Didn't used to be. But you could see as that that cycle happens that what happens is increasingly where it used to be equity. Now you have to go to debt. And that plays a bigger role. Ray, you've got to wonder if six percent is just a psychological level or would six percent carry a lot of macroeconomic risk? How might that play out if we get to six? And is six actually the ceiling? Might we see six and a half? I think I think that you don't look at the interest rate. It'll have an effect. Of course, you look at the interest rate. But what I mean is you look at what is the amount of savings? What is the total amount of capital? And what is the demand for capital? And when you get that imbalance, that supply demand imbalance, then you have to have the price of it go up until you ration that demand. So you have to ask yourself, what is it that's going to be rationed in that? And and so then we're dealing with it's not going to be government deficits because they're inelastic. In other words, in fact, if you had a worse economy, they would increase. So then you find out who are the sectors that are squeezed out. Is it housing? Housing would be quick. But with such a large difference in financial conditions of the wealthy and the poor, you're going to see that happening more at the lower end of that spectrum. So is it auto loans? Is it those kinds of loans then get squeezed out first and something like data centers come later. And so that's why you start to have more of a wealth conflict, because then the people who have less get squeezed the most in that part of the cycle. Given the current environment, you have said before that capital isn't necessarily gravitating towards the U.S. anymore. Where is it going? Well, the magnitude we're talking about the enormous magnitude. So, yes, the United States now is running large deficits and it is receiving a lot of capital. However, that because of the changes, foreign capital represents about a third, almost a third in the amount of money that we're relying on in terms of debt. And that is also then coming has been coming from the Chinese and the Japanese. They constituted a high percentage of that debt. And so and then there were other countries and the Middle East and so on. But they're starting to get squeezed. And also there are these geopolitical issues that enter into it. So the Chinese don't want to continue to accumulate. There are geopolitical issues as well as economic issues. When you have a debtor creditor relationship and you have an adversary relationship, that's a very difficult dynamic, particularly the sizes. And then Japan, Japan has lent a lot of money because of other desires to change their economic policies in ways that I would describe. They've lent a lot of money. Now they want to take back some of that money, a lot of that. So not only do you have the total size being very large, the size of our deficits are very large and total financing needs is very large because it's not just the fiscal deficit of the government. It is also the A.I. and other large expenditures. So where does that saving come from? That comes from those sources which are tightening. And that's why you're seeing the changes in interest rates. In other words, interest rates change. It's like the it is the cost of money. And when there's a supply demand imbalance, you see then interest rates rise to ration credit. And that's what we're seeing. And Ray, when it comes to debt concerns, it's not just the U.S. I mean, take a look at Europe, France in particular. We saw the massive sell off and some are concerned that we could see contagion risks on the back of that. Do you see that happening? Well, it's it's the European situation is the same. And because there is a lack of adequate borrowing, imagine you've in Europe and large parts of the United States, you've lived on the borrowing. And then when you reach your borrowing limit, as France has done, then there's a bind because then you cannot continue to add to that. You have to start to run budget deficits because you almost get to the point where you have to pay back. In other words, if you borrow, you have to pay back. And when that happens, then you have a situation very similar to that. So now you see the desire for greater taxation. You see people leave. You see whether they're from France or whether different parts of the United States, they leave. And then that creates a problem. So France is in that particular position. But it's a European problem, too. So we can see that there's been too much of that debt. And then, of course, it's gone down. So when it's gone down, it's like an asset. The bonds as interest rates rise, bonds go down. And so look at the difference in the returns of bonds and equities as a result of this. They have been a negative reinforcement. So now you're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing. You're seeing.